Abstract
Introduction
Data security is one of the basic requirements in computer software design, and it is most commonly achieved by means of cryptographic algorithms and protocols. These techniques do not suffice to guarantee security of applications unless cryptographic keys are securely managed. The most effective means for protecting keys, today, is the adoption of smart card technology, that delegates management of cryptographic keys to external trusted devices. Even if smart cards have been widely adopted and supported on proprietary platforms, they are not being used on open platforms due to the lack of open solutions. On these systems open source libraries and applications allow the use of cryptography for data protection, but the achieved security level is strongly limited because of the use of software-only cryptography. A few solutions exist supporting only one or a limited set of smart card devices.
In our opinion, the reasons for this limitation have been, among others, the differences among devices from different vendors, trying to differentiate products with respect to competition, and the lack of open standards for interoperability. The MUSCLE 1 Card protocol, which is being introduced in this paper, constitutes a step toward openness in smart card middleware design and implementation. We believe that this protocol, along with the open framework that is being developed around it for smart card development, will promote adoption of these devices on open platforms. This paper is structured as follows. Next section introduces common issues involved in smart card interoperability, and section 3 briefly discusses how existing standards approached them. Section 4 presents the new protocol, underlining and motivating the main choices at the base of its design. Section 5 introduces some practical aspects related to protocol implementation, showing how they have been dealt with in the implementation for Java Card devices. Section 6 shows some of the extensions that could be embedded in the protocol to make it suitable for a wider range of applications.
The problem of smart card interoperability
In spite of the growing need for smart card integration into applications and the advantages arising from their use, smart card devices are struggling for wider use in network security applications. This is especially true for open platforms, where a strong demand by the developers' community exists for the use of unrestricted libraries and applications. Open source software and open solutions are probably the right match for this demand. Although many open source programs exist which embed cryptographic services, most of them still lack the support for external cryptographic smart cards due to the complexity in integrating such devices. This complexity exists for several reasons: different types of card devices exist, including storage only, crypto-enabled, GSM enabled, with general purpose CPU, programmable in Java, Assembler, Basic. In spite of the efforts made by various organizations in defining common standards [5, 3, 8 ] for interoperability at a protocol level, different card devices have partial implementations, proprietary extensions and uncommon filesystems; many smart cards have closed protocols and functionality: this makes their use within open solutions impossible; the card life cycle is short, and by the time a device is supported on less common systems like most Unix variations, it ceases to be manufactured. Today many applications exist on closed platforms that use smart cards for the only purpose of securely storing and managing user cryptographic keys and a few related data. Some examples are PKI 2 based applications, like digital signature programs, secure on-line web services, secure e-mail. These applications face with the interoperability problem by adopting common interfaces at a software level, like the PKCS#11 [9] or PCSC [7] . Unfortunately, the modules implementing these interfaces are usually provided by card vendors only for those platforms that are considered of interest. Rarely they provide an implementation for open platforms. On the other hand, programmable smart cards have always been used in the context of secure solutions (a common example is a prepaid card) with application specific tasks to be performed by the external device. A custom program is loaded on the card implementing a custom protocol to exchange data with the application. In this paper an hybrid approach is introduced, where a program is loaded onto a programmable card allowing exposure of cryptographic and storage services to generic applications by means of an open protocol. The advantage of this approach is that it is possible to both use the generic services provided by the program, and to implement custom commands in order to satisfy specific application requirements. Existing standard protocols are too much complex to be implemented on such devices.
Existing solutions
In this section some existing protocols for smart card interoperability are described. These protocols define protocol data units (APDUs) that are exchanged between a host and a smart card, relying on the T=0 or T=1 [4] lower level protocols.
Probably the most commonly implemented standard protocol for smart cards is the ISO 7816 [5] , Part 4. It defines commands to browse an on-board filesystem, read/write data from/to files, allow mutual authentication of the card and external users and applications, manage multiple logical communication channels with a card, and perform authenticated and/or encrypted APDU exchanges (secure messaging). Different types of files are defined: dedicated files store directory information, while elementary files store application data. Authentication of external users/applications can be performed by means of a PIN code verification, or by running a cryptographic authentication protocol. Authentication of the card to external applications can also be performed by running a cryptographic authentication protocol. The ISO 7816-4 standard addressed from inception 2 Public Key Infrastructures.
only issues related to card use, while commands for creating the on-card filesystem, as well as the ones for loading, using and managing cryptographic keys on the card, are completely missing. Only later the ISO 7816-8 and ISO 7816-9 standards [5] fixed the missing specifications, when tenths of card devices were already on the market with proprietary protocol extensions. The final protocol arising from ISO standards is very powerful and flexible. It has command APDUs for: calculation of cryptographic primitives and hash functions; calculation and verification of digital signatures; verification of on-board public key certificates; data encryption and decryption; and creation and management of security environments and security associations, allowing the definition, for each card resource and operation, of complex access control rules (ACRs).
On a related note, the PKCS#15 standard [8] defines, in the context of an ISO on-card filesystem, a file and directory format for storing security-related information on cryptographic tokens, like digital certificates, cryptographic keys, and authentication data (i.e. PIN codes). The ISO 7816-7 standard defines a set of command APDUs that allow a smart card to expose advanced data retrieval facilities to applications. This way an application can specify a SQL-like search query, and retrieve only those records that match the query.
A further protocol for smart cards is the US Government SC Interoperability Specification [3] , defining specific commands for an interoperable use of smart cards in the US Government context. In example, file formats are defined for the general information file, containing personal user information, for the protected personal information file, and for the X.509 certificate files. The standard defines a set of ISO 7816-4 compliant commands for on-card filesystem, PIN verification and host/card authentication, plus additional commands for computing RSA digital signatures and encryption operations, and for retrieval of a public key certificate associated with an on-board key. The card access control model allows a predefined set of protection modes for card resources.
Interoperability issues among cryptographic smart card devices are faced with in a different way by the Java Card¢
standards [11, 12, 13] . These documents refer to cards with an on-board Java Virtual Machine (JVM), that are able to execute custom Java programs, called Applets. The standards define a subset of the Java language and Runtime Environment (JRE) that must be supported by the oncard JVMs, and a standard API that must be exposed to the Applets in order to allow access to on-board crypto facilities. This way it is possible to write a program that runs on any compliant smart card, implementing a custom protocol for communicating with the host. Fortunately this standard is being adopted by different card manufacturers. Both for its success, and for the well designed on-card cryptographic API, this platform has been chosen for implementation of the protocol introduced in this paper.
Protocol Overview
This section features a technical overview of the protocol. The discussion only addresses protocol's main features, and explains main design choices. The complete protocol specification [1] is available for download at the URL: http://www.musclecard.com.
Objectives and design choices
The project has been focused from inception on the release of an open, simple, card independent, complete and freely available card protocol that allows a host application to talk to any programmable smart card, in order to access cryptographic and storage facilities on the card. The main goal in protocol design was retaining enough generality to satisfy requirements of a multitude of target applications, comprising digital signature, secure e-mail, secure login, secure remote terminal and secure on-line web services, both PKI based and not. These requirements have been identified in having a means of generating, importing, exporting, and using cryptographic keys on the card. Also required is having a means of creating, reading, and writing generic data on the card in "containers". This is useful, for example, to store a public key certificate associated with a private key on the card. Access to some of these resources needs to be granted only after host application and user authentication. Another requirement is the independence of the managed data chunks from the lower level T=0 APDU size limitations, so to preserve the ability to handle large keys and data chunks that will be needed in a near future. The fundamental constraint on the protocol design was due to the limited card memory of todays' programmable devices (ranging from 16 to 64 KBytes), resulting in the requirement of a size-contained code for the on-board protocol implementation. This results in serious constraints on the protocol complexity, which needs to be as low as possible. The result has been a simple and light protocol that is more suitable than already existing ones for programmable card devices, given the limited amount of available memory and computational resources. As a remark, the developed Applet implementing the entire protocol has a code size of around 10 KBytes. On a Schlumberger Cyberflex Access 32K card, this leaves enough free space on the card for keys, certificates, additional application data, and further Applets to be loaded on the card for additional services.
Other Java Card Applets exist exposing on-board functions to host applications, like the dnPKI Applet [6] , with a much smaller code size. It is important to note that such Applets are specifically designed for PKI applications, so they only allow to use on-board cryptographic keys of a fixed
that embeds functions required by PKI applications, but it is not necessarily tied to them. The protocol design allows future extensions, like the use of alternative key types or authentication mechanisms, as proved by the biometrics extensions that have been recently added.
The protocol design explicitly addresses initialization issues, such as how data or key objects are created on the card, and what authorizations are needed for these operations. The protocol does not address sophisticated card services that might be needed by specific applications. Multikey digital signatures and authentication schemes may need specific cryptographic protocols to be performed on multiple cards. These applications can still benefit from the exposed protocol and open implementation, by extending them with the required functionality.
Protocol command set
With respect to the T=0 and T=1 protocols, standing at the transport layer according to the terminology defined in [2], section 7, our protocol stands above, at the application layer, identifying a set of commands that a smart card program should support. The protocol specification exactly defines what class, instruction, parameter and data bytes must be provided by the host for each command, and what data is expected in response, if any, from the card, along with the possible error codes that identify abnormal conditions during command execution. A list of the commands available in our protocol specification is reported in 
Data storage services
The protocol encapsulates applications' data into simple containers, called objects, identified by means of a 32 bit object identifier (OID). Access control is enforced on a perobject and per-operation basis, distinguishing among create, read, write and delete operations (more details on this are given in section 4.6.) The data storage services suffice for the above cited applications, by allowing them to store, retrieve and manage data onto a card in a secure and controlled way.
The protocol does not provide hierarchic arrangement of objects, nor typed objects, conversely to other approaches [3] . However, a range of object identifiers has been reserved for future use. They could be used to support extended features, like file or certificate directories, that could be managed by the card with a set of extension commands.
The protocol specification does not address issues like how objects should be created and managed on the card, how many objects are allowed to exist due to constraints (i.e. allocation tables), how free object memory is to be handled by applications (i.e. by use of compaction or full defragmentation of free blocks). Applications only view the total available memory, and whether a given object can be created or not depends on the specific on-board memory management.
Cryptographic services
The protocol allows up to 16 keys to be stored and managed on the card, identified by means of a numeric key identifier. A full key pair can be stored using two key identifiers. Key types are those provided by the Java Card 2.1.1 API: RSA, DSA, DES, Triple DES, Triple DES with 3 keys. The protocol is designed in such a way to allow further key types to be easily added in the future.
Operations provided on cryptographic keys are import/export from/to the host, calculation of cryptograms, and listing of keys, which provides size and type information. All key operations but key listing are allowed only after proper host application/user authentication. The protocol allows asymmetric key pairs to be directly generated on board guaranteeing the private key can never be exposed outside the card. In this case the public key can be obtained by the host application with an ExportKey operation to be performed after the key pair generation. When a key pair is created on-board, the host application specifies under what conditions subsequent reading, overwriting and use operations are allowed for each of the keys in the pair. The same rules can be specified when importing a new key from the outside world by means of an ImportKey command.
Input and output objects
Objects are also used to overcome the T=0 protocol's limitation of 256 bytes per APDU exchange 3 . The problem is solved by introducing an offset field as a parameter to the ReadObject and WriteObject commands, so that reading or writing of a long data chunk can be performed by invoking multiple times the commands with increasing offset values. When dealing with exchange of cryptographic keys or cryptograms, instead, this limit was overcome by reserving two object identifiers for an input object and an output object. These are used for providing and retrieving long data to and from other commands. For example, in order to import a key into the card, the key data must be placed into the import object, then an ImportKey command simply reads the key data from that object. Similarly, to export a key, the ExportKey command calculates the key data and leaves it into the export object to be retrieved in subsequent commands by the host application (it's up to the application to delete the output object after retrieval of information).
I/O objects can contain sensitive information like key values or application plain text data, so special attention must be paid to their management. In fact operations using the I/O objects must be split in 3 or more protocol commands, where only the last one deletes the involved I/O object. If execution of the command sequence is interrupted for any reason, this object would not be deleted, retaining its contents. These problems have been avoided by requesting that the I/O objects should be deleted as soon as possible, and always at card reset.
Security model and access control enforcement
A simple Access Control List (ACL) is defined, allowing operations to be performed only after proper host application and user authentication. This may be performed by means of a PIN code verification, a challenge-response cryptographic authentication protocol, or a combination of both methods. Furthermore, the protocol has been designed to allow future support for other identification schemes, like fingerprint verification or others. Access rules for on-card resources are specified by using the concept of identity. This term refers to one of several authentication mechanisms that host applications and users can use to be authenticated to a smart card. Identities, PINs, and cryptographic keys are referred to by means of numeric identifiers. Different types of identity are defined: identities n.0-7 are said PIN-based and are associated, respectively, with PIN codes n.0-7; identities n.8-13 are said strong and are associated, respectively, with cryptographic keys n.0-5 for the purpose of running challenge-response cryptographic authentication protocols; identities n.14-15 are reserved 4 . A successful run of one of the authentication mechanisms causes the log in of the associated identity, in addition to identities already logged in. This way a host application can gradually switch to a higher security level that grants access to more and more of the card's capabilities, as it runs additional authentication mechanisms. Furthermore the LogOutAll command allows a host application to return back to the unauthenticated security status. A little subset of possible security states and transitions due to successful authentication commands is shown in figure 1 .
An ACL specifies which identities are required to grant access to each operation of each object or key. Object operations are read, write and delete. Key operations are overwrite (either by means of regeneration or by means of import), export, and use. An ACL associated with an object or key is specified by means of three Access Control Words (ACW), each one relating to an operation. An ACW consists of 16 bits. Each bit corresponds to one of the 16 identities that can be logged in. An all-zero ACW means that the operation is publicly available, that is a host application can perform it without any prior authentication. An ACW with one or more bits set means that all of the corresponding identities must be logged in at the time the operation is performed. An all-one ACW has the special meaning of completely disabling the operation, independently of the connection security status. This is useful to disable reading of private keys. The security model has enough freedom to allow at least four levels of protection for card services. An operation can be always allowed if the ACW requires no authentication, PIN protected if the ACW requires a PIN verification, strongly protected if the ACW requires a strong authentication, and disabled if the ACW is all-ones, forbidding its execution. As an example, use of a private key onto a smart card is usually PIN protected, but some applications could require a strong protection. Reading of a private key is usually disabled. Public objects may always be readable, but their modification could be PIN protected. Private objects could require PIN protection for reading and possibly strong protection for writing.
PIN management
APDUs have been defined for PIN management, enabling to create, verify, change and unblock PINs. Several PIN codes are allowed onto a single card. A special PIN (transport PIN, n.0) is assumed to exist right after the program has been loaded and instantiated on a card, and it must be verified to allow a host application to create further resources on the card. This has been imposed to prevent allocation of card resources without user knowledge.
The protocol has been designed to allow multiple applications to use the same card and the same program instance on that card, without interfering. This could be obtained in a simple way by creating multiple instances of the same Java Applet. Given that the total memory to be reserved for an Applet instance must be specified at instantiation time, such an approach suffers from an excessive allocation of card resources. By allowing multiple applications to use the same Applet instance, we allow dynamic allocation of card resources to applications when needed. Each application must be able to manage its own PIN, data objects and keys. This has been accomplished in two ways: requiring verification of the transport PIN to allow creation of new PINs, objects and cryptographic keys, and allowing an application to create additional identities by means of creating further PIN(s) or cryptographic key(s); these identities can be required in ACLs of application specific objects and keys that are "sensitive" for the application. For example, when "formatting" the card, an application should create a new PIN and require all of its data and keys to be protected by that PIN.
Extensibility
Our protocol's main purpose is to allow new generation programmable cards to expose basic cryptographic and data storage facilities to host applications in a way that does not depend on the specific card. So particular attention has been paid to extensions that could be needed in the future.
In order to allow such extensions to be performed without compromising previously developed software, the protocol has versioning built into it. The version information is available through the GetStatus command, by means of minor and major version numbers. An increment in the minor version number should retain compatibility with already written software. An increment in the major version number, instead, would not retain such a compatibility, and would mean a change in some of the protocol core features.
Implementation notes
The protocol has been implemented and used with various applications. On the card-side, an open source Java Card Applet compliant to the protocol specification has been developed and tested both on Schlumberger Cyberflex Access 32K and Gemplus P11/PK cards. On the host-side, a new smart card middleware has been developed, exposing to upper software layers an open smart card API that almost maps one to one with the protocol itself. The API is generic enough to allow development of plug-ins for different types of cards, within the same middleware. On top of this layer, various software components have been developed. An open source PKCS#11 module allows integration of smart-cards within applications using this standard on open platforms, like Mozilla and Netscape£ ¥ Communicator, which are now able to perform secure access to web sites and to sign e-mail messages using the exposed Applet and protocol. An open source Pluggable Authentication Module [10] has also been developed, allowing smart card based secure login and access to applications. A module has been added to the OpenSSH software, an open source implementation of the Secure Shell protocol [14] , for smart card based remote terminal. The new API has also been used for developing PKI based digital signature applications (Sign-MCard and QDigSig), and a Qt based smart card manager (XCardII), allowing to manage the on-card resources exposed through the protocol. All software components have been developed and tested on a variety of open platforms, including Linux distributions and Mac OS/X, and are available for free download either from the Muscle Card web site (http://www.musclecard.com), or from the Smart Sign web site (http://smartsign.sourceforge.net).
As a proof of concept, the protocol extension mechanism has been recently used for providing a biometric extension to the Applet. This allows management of a new identity type, that logs in after a successful run of an on-card fingerprint verification algorithm. The extended Applet allows, for example, to use an on-board private key or to read onboard object contents, only after the user has been authenticated by matching the fingerprint template provided by the host against the one stored on-board.
Conclusions and future work
A new open protocol for smart card interoperability has been introduced, allowing programmable card devices to expose storage and cryptographic services to host applications With respect to existing protocols for smart card interoperability, the exposed one aims at being implemented in software on programmable devices, with heavy resource constraints. The protocol has reduced functionality, sufficing for most applications that use card devices for authentication and digital signature purposes, comprising PKI based applications. Software components and applications developed around the new protocol have been described. In our opinion the open protocol specifications, along with the open source components developed, make a step toward simplification in engaging smart card technology into crypto aware applications on open platforms.
Still the efforts have been focused on target applications mainly dealing with user authentication and digital signatures, while security services exist that require special operations to be performed by a smart card and do not actually fit into the protocol's model. Future investigation will be aimed at finding the minimal set of operations that could be added to the protocol in order to allow deployment of a wider set of security services to applications, while maintaining backward compatibility. Another possibility could be standardization of object identifiers in order to allow applications to share information onto a smart card, in a fashion that is similar to what PKCS#15 [8] does today with ISO7816-4 filesystem enabled cards. Finally, a proper mapping between PKCS#15 file IDs and object OIDs could allow interoperability with PKCS#15 enabled smart cards.
